Henry Early v. Karl L. Jackson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1951
Henry Early v. Karl L. Jackson : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Edgar C. Jensen; Robert A. Burns; Robert John Jensen; Attorneys for Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Early v. Jackson, No. 7725 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1580
7725 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HENRY EARLY, 
Respondent, 
vs. No. 7725 
KARL L. JACKSON, 
.Appellant. 
f~ I LEn 
OCT 1 :J ;cu.~·t 
vv1 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
--~l:~Jk--8-----------------
, Upre.rn C -............. ., ___ _ 
e ourt, Uta.li 
Appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, Ray Van ·Cott, Jr. Judge. 
EDGAR C. JENSEN 
ROBERT A. BURNS 
ROBERT JOHN JENSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.......................................................... 3 
THE FACTS ------------------ ........ -.... --- ...... ------------------.-----------.---.--.------ 4 
POINTS RELIED UPON.................................................................. 17 
The Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence .............. 17 
ARGUMENT: .. ------------------------------·---- --------- ........... ----------- ........ ...... 17 
CONCLUSION --------·-------------- ----------- .................... _ ... . ... . .... .. . . ........... 3 7 
STATUTES 
Section 57-7-7 8. 5 (d) Utah Code...................................................... 2 9 
Section 57-7-14 6 Utah Code .......... --------------------·-·--------------------------- 3 2 
Section 57-7-16 5, Utah Code·--------------------------··-----------------------·------- 18 
Section 57-7-16 7 ( 13) Utah Code-----------··--------------------------------------- 2 0 
Section 57-7-191 Utah Code·-----------·········------········----·····--·-----------·· 21 
Section 57-7-212 Utah Code·-----------------·-·······---------------------·-·-··--··-- 2 2 
Section- 57-7-213 Utah Code--------------------------------------------······----~------ 2 2 
CASES 
Ashley vs. Safeway, Inc., 4 7 Pac. ( 2) 53---------------------------------------- 2 4 
Barone vs. Jones, 177 Pac. (2) 30-------------·-··-------···--····----····------·-- 24 
Duncan vs. Madrid, 101 Pac. ( 2) 3 82............................................ 2 4 
Greisen vs. Robins, et ux, 216 Pac. (2) 210·--------········---·----------·-· 25 
Hall, et ux vs. Associated Oil Co., 68 Pac. (2) 984---------------------- 24 
Harris vs. Parks, 58 Utah 42, 196 Pac. 1002----------------··--·····--------- 35 
Hine vs. Leppard, 42 Pac. ( 2) 3 8 9---··---------····----------------------------·--· 2 4 
Huston vs. Robinson, 13 N. W. ( 2) 8 8 5---------------------------------------- 19 
Keller vs. Brenneman, 2 7 9 Pac. 58 8----·-------·------------···------------------ 2 8 
Mingus vs. Olsson, 201 Pac. ( 2) 495----······------····-------------------·--··-- 29 
Newton vs. Pacific Highway, etc., 139 Pac (2) 725-------------······-~- 23 
Paulson vs. Spencer, 17 7 Pac. 59 7 -----·--·-···-·-··-----··---··-------·------2 4, 2 7 
Reid vs. Owen, 93 Pac. (2) 680, 98 Utah 50------------·-······--------·--- 29 
Sant vs. Miller, 20 6 Pac. ( 2) 719-----------------------···--·····--···~-----·------· 2 9 
Thomson vs. Bayless, 15 0 Pac. ( 2) 413.·-·--------··--·-·-··-·--·········------- 19 
Yates vs. Morrotti, 8 Pac. ( 2) 519 .................................................. 35 
TEXTS 
3 8 American Jurisprudence, Negligence, page 6 8 7 ···----------·····-····· 3 4 
65 Corpus Juris Secundum, Negligence, Page 727 et seq ............. 33 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HENRY EARLY, 
vs. No. 7725 
KARL L. JACKSON, 
App:ellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from :a judgment entered June 
13, 1951, (R. 6) in the District Court of . Salt Lake 
County, Utah. Motion for a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict was filed.June 20, 1951, (R. 8) and denied 
June 22, 1951 (R. 9-10). N·otice of appeal was filed 
July 18, 1951 (R. 11). The appeal is from the judgment 
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and the denial of the motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict. The judgment was against defendant 
Carl L. Jackson alone ~as the other defendant was 
never served nor appeared. Consequently C.arl L. 
Jackson is the only appellant. The case was one for 
damages arising out of a highway accident near 
Laketown, Utah, April 3, 1950. The pleas of the 
parties (R. 1 and 4) were by way of negligence and 
contributory· negligence and by this appeal the only 
question raised is the sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port the verdict and judgment. 
THE FACTS 
No attempt ~11 be made here to review the testi-
mony of the medical witnesses as the appellant concedes 
it, together with other evidence in the record of damage 
and injury, is amply sufficient to support the amount 
of the verdict. So we proceed to the facts as we con-
sider them material in view of the question r:aised by 
this appeal. 
The plaintiff testified he was employed at Lake-
town, Utah, by one Parnell Johnson, as a butcher and 
truck driver (R. 96). On April 3, 1950 at about 7:00 
or 7 :30 when it was dark the :accident complained about 
took place (R. 85). The weather was clear, it had rained 
that afternoon and the highway was damp. The high .. 
way was state highway 3, which runs generally east and 
west. The highway was about 20 feet wide, had a hard 
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surface and near the point of the accident a creek 
crosses under it in a culvert from south to north (R. 99). 
West of the culvert the highway is straight :and level 
for approximately half a mile (R. 100). Shoulders of 
three or four feet are on either side of the highway 
(R. 101). Guard posts were in place on either side of 
the highway near the culvert on the shoulders (R. 103). 
From the edge of the highway is quite a steep slope 
leading down to the creek (R. 104). 
On April 3, 1950, plaintiff drove 'a truck along this 
highway. He had a load of offal from his employer's 
slaughter house in the bed of the truck and intended 
to dump that offal into the creek (R. 105). He parked 
his truck by hacking the same so the rear was over the 
culvert, his rear wheels two or three feet off the oil. 
The car pointed in the northeasterly -direction and the 
front of the vehicle was about a foot from the center 
of the highway (R. 106). After so parking he got out 
of the cab and into the rear of the truck and started to 
unload (R. 107). He heard a ear approaching :and looked 
up and saw lights approaching from the west (R. 109-
11). He got back in the cab, attempted to start the truck, 
but it w·ouldn 't start and then he got out of the cab and 
ran down the north side of the highway waving his 
arm (R. 111). He had left the lights burning on the 
headlight beams. He thought he was 100 or 140 feet 
west of the culvert when he heard the brakes screech. 
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At that time he was at the north edge of the oil. The 
next thing he knew he waked up in the hos~~ital (R. 
113). The rest of his direct examination has to do with 
his injuries and damages and we do not review it. 
On cross examination he stated he had loaded the 
truek at Laketown with offal from :animals slaughtered 
that day (R. 124); that highway is a through stop 
highway (R. 125-6); that he had been over the highw:ay 
many times and the highway led from Garden ·City to 
Montpelier, Idaho (R. 123-4). He identified exhibit 1, 
a photograph, as a picture of the same type of truck 
with the same type of body as the one he drove that 
night. Exhibit 2 was also identified by the witness as a 
picture with the camera pointed east and showing the 
highway from a point west of the culvert and beyond 
the culvert (R. 129). The posts shown in the picture 
are the guard posts he spoke about on direct (R. 130). 
He parked his truck with the hack end to the south and 
the front toward the north with front nearly to the 
middle of the highway (R. 131). He used a shovel to 
push the offal off the truck into the creek. He had 
turned the motor off but left the headlights on. He 
had gotten out the driver's side, on the left, to get into 
the bed of the truck (the side toward the west and the 
side from which the automobile ap1>~roached (R. 133). 
At the point where the creek crosses, and at the point 
where he parked his truck, there was a six foot drop 
to the creek (R. 137). He then testified: 
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Q. nlr. Earley, the manner in which you 
parked your truck there that night effectively 
blocked the eastbound lane on that highway, 
didn't it! 
A. The south lane, yes sir. 
Q. And anybody 'vho was using that high-
way, in order to get around you, had to get over 
on the north side of the highway, on the west-
bound lane J? Did he not~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. So you had parked your car entirely 
across a main lane of traffic on that highway, 
had you not? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. N·ow you didn't put any flares out on 
either side of your truck, did you' 
A. No sir. 
Q. You knew you were taking a big chance 
when you parked a vehicle in that f:ashion, didn't 
you' 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And you kne\v that you were creating 
a dangerous situation on that highway, didn't 
you! 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. How long did you anticipate that it would 
take you to unload your vehicle' 
A. ;Oh, I would say four or five minutes. 
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He testified !as he was shoveling his back was toward 
the west (the direction from which the car approached) 
(R. 139) that he heard the noise and saw the approaching 
headlights he jumped out of the hack of the truck to 
the ground and then got in the cab behind the wheel and 
attempted to start the car (R. 140). All this time he 
kept an eye to his left and saw the car app.roaching and 
then he testified he had to do something else (R. 143) 
and so he got out of the car and started running down 
the highway waving his ~arms (R. 144). He testified: 
Q. Now Mr. Earley, you knew that this 
car, in order to get around your car, would have 
to get over on the north half of the highway, 
didn't you~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You knew that and appreciated it at 
the time, didn't you~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And yet knowing all that in your at-
tempts to extricate yourself ·from this predica-
ment you had put yourself in you went down the 
north half of that highway~ Isn't that right' 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Right in the f:ace of that on,coming auto-
mobile, isn't that correct~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Knowing full well that that man could 
not proceed except by getting over in that lane' 
You knew that, too didn't you~ 
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A. I kne'v that man could stop if he would. 
Q. You knew, too, that he could not proceed 
except by getting over into that lane, didn't you' 
A. Yes sir. Yes sir. 
Q. So you had blocked half of the highway 
with your car, h~adn 't you' 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And now you blocked the other half 
with yourself, didn't you~ 
A. I would't say that, no sir. 
Q. You wouldn't say that~ Well, you were 
in the other half of the highway, running down 
there pell mell, weren't you~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Waving your arms~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You knew the highway was twenty feet 
wide ; or thereabouts T 
(No answer appears.) 
Q. Did you think at the time the man Wias 
doing seventy miles an hour~ 
A. I did, sir. 
Q. And yet you expected him to stop~ 
A. Well, he could have done, I think. 
Q. Y·ou expected him to stop~ 
A. Yes sir. 
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Q. You did~ At seventy miles an hour? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And you got down 150 feet from where 
this car was that you had parked. 
A. He could've seen my car. 
Q. I didn't ·ask that. You got down 150 
feet from where this car was ~~arked ~ 
A. Approximately. 
Q. You had to give him some room to stop 
in, didn't you~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And you knew very well that in attempt-
ing to stop of course he would turn to the left so 
that if he didn't stop he would ~at least avoid the 
parked truck~ You knew that, didn't you~ 
A. No sir, I didn't. 
Q. You didn't know? 
A. Of anything at the time. 
Q. You thought he would go, just go along 
straight and stop 1a couple of inches from your 
truck? Is that what you thought~ 
A. I was in hopes he would. 
Q. He showed no perceptible slowing down, 
did he~ 
A. No. 
Q. As far as you observed? 
A. No sir. 
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Q. And yet you expected him to stop' 
A. I was in hopes of it. 
Q. Yes, you were in hopes of it. Why didn't 
you get entirely off of the highway1 
A. You ·couldn't very handy right there. 
Q. You could have moved over to the left, 
couldn't you, your left, the south side of this 
high,vay¥ 
A. I could, yes sir. 
Q. As a matter of fact, if you had gone down 
on the south side of the highway on your left 
this vehicle never would have struck you, would 
·t~ I . 
A. It might not have, I didn't know that. 
(R. 147) 
He said he was on the oiled highway at all times as 
he ran to the west toward the approaching car (R. 127) 
and that at the time he was hit he could have been as 
close as 50 feet from his parked truck. (R. 50) 
Roland Reese testified that he was a state highway 
p.atrolman, that he visited the scene of the accident the 
next day (R. 160). He made some observations at the 
scene of the accident. He stated the guard posts near 
the culvert were right near the hard surface portion 
of the highway; that the highway was 21 feet wide; 
that the guard posts were about the width of the high-
way apart (R. 162-3). He stated he found tire tracks 
114 feet 6 inches long on the paved portion of the road 
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going in a diagonal course over to the left side of the 
highway facing east; that they then went off the paved 
portion and for 30 feet they continued on the dirt 
shoulder until they went off the road entirely down the 
embankment into the creek; that the tire marks off the 
p1aved portion showed the ·car was skidding sideways 
(R. 166) :and that those appeared right over the culvert 
(R. 167). 
He stated at the point the tire tracks first appeared 
south of the culvert they were astraddle the center of 
the highway (R. 169). He stated he visited the scene 
on April 6th, three days after the accident. He further 
stated the m~arks on the highway indicated a tire sliding 
on the road (R. 174). 
Several witnesses testified about arriving at the 
scene of the accident. Muder's automobile (which had 
struck plaintiff) was north of the highway down over 
the embankment and somewhat east of the place where 
plaintiff's truck was still iparked on the highway (R. 
179). Plaintiff had been knocked into the creek and was 
brought out by the witness Willis (R. 177). Muder told 
one of these witnesses he was driving awful fast and 
he hit Earley awful hard. Some more ·conversations are 
detailed at (R. 184 and 185). 
One witness stated he drove 1a car past the parked 
truck without getting off the highway (R. 184). He 
stated the Muder ·car was off the road about 25 feet east 
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of the high,vay and in the slough facing the highway 
(R. 198). He observed tracks on the highway starting 
about 100 feet '""est of the culvert and continuing e1ast 
(R. 202) and to the north until they came opposite to 
a point vvhere the pickup truck vvas parked by Earley, 
where the tracks indicated the rear end of the Muder 
vehicle had swung around on the shoulder and then 
down into the slough east of the -creek (R. 203). 
It was agreed the Johnson truck ~as driven by 
plaintiff was 151;4 feet front bumper to the rear of the 
bed of the truck and from the front bumper to the 
farthest portion of the rear tire was 131;4 feet (R. 215). 
The sheriff of the county testified he visited the 
scene the day following the accident; that he noticed tire 
marks in the highway commencing in the south (or east-
bound lane) ; that they traveled about 10 feet in the 
south or east bound lane; that they continued to the 
northeast; that they got off the oiled road 130 fee from 
where they started to turn out of the south lane and 
that it was 144 feet 6 inches from where the marks 
started to the point where the Muder car came to rest 
north of the high--w:ay and in the slough (R. 219, et seq). 
The sheriff identified Exhibit 3, being a picture of the 
Muder truck as it appeared when he saw it the morning 
following the accident (R. 226). 
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Elijah Willis (R. 227) testified about leaving home 
and going over to the highway and seeing the accident 
happen. It was he who found !plaintiff in the water in 
the stream and it was he who got Earley out of the 
stream and up to the highway. 
He picked up Earley's hat and gloves on the edge 
of the oiled road at a guard rail post 45 feet from where 
he picked Earley up out of the ·creek (R. 233). 
M uder ( R. 248) testified on the day in question he 
was 24 years old; that he was employed by the defendant 
as a salesman; that he was in the process of driving in 
his employer's automobile from his residence on Bear 
Lake to Laketown on some business of his employer 
when the accident occurred (R. 251). He had been 
over this highway many times before, having worked 
1n the neighborhood for sometime (R. 252). 
He stated after he passed the curve about one-half 
mile west of the culvert where Big ·Creek passes under 
the highway, he was traveling around 45 miles per hour; 
maybe a little more. His headlights were on high beam 
(R. 233-4). After he got on the st:r~aight aw,ay he noticed 
some headlights facing him up at Laketown. (This was 
beyond the culvert in the direction he was traveling). 
As he proceeded along he noticed a small light; and 
when he saw that he started to brake down. Then he s·aw 
the truck across the highway and he could tell his lane 
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,vas blocked. He turned left into the north lane, slowing 
down and got to a jp.oint "~here he was certain he ·could 
get past the truck "~hen the man moved up in his head-
lights \Yith his hands over his head running toward him 
(R. 255). \Vhen he saw the man in front of him he hit 
his brakes hard and he Inight have cut back to avoid the 
man; his truck went into a skid and he slid down the 
embankment on the east side of the creek (R. 256). 
When he came to rest he was about ·6 feet below the 
level of the road (R. 257). From the time he saw the 
light and the truck his attention was directed on it and he 
kept his eyes on it (R. 257). He estimated he was 30 
to 40 feet from the truck when the truck struck Earley 
and after striking Earley the truck went into a skid 
and down the embankment. It did not tip over. He 
got out of the truck ·a.nd saw a n1an standing over across 
the stream (the witness Willis) and got there just as 
Earley was being pulled out of the stream (R. 258). He 
stated the highway was damp as he approached the creek 
and there was mist rising from the creek (R. 261) but 
this latter statement is contr·ary to the other witnesses. 
Exhibit 3 was identified as a picture of his truck 
after the accident and he stated the dent shown in the 
front of the truck was caused when Muder was struck 
(R. 262). At the time of the collision no part of his 
vehicle was to the left of the oiled portion of the high-
way. 
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His cross examination w~a.s essentially the same. He 
stated visibility was good (R. 265); that he had no parti-
cular memory of having looked at the speedmeter but 
he gauged his speed by reason of his experience with the 
vehicle and how it operated (R. 266-7). He stated he 
was blinded by no lights. When asked he testified he 
was 200 or 300 feet from the ·culvert when he first sraw 
the low light (the headlight on the parked truck) (R. 
268) which light a;p,peared to be in the center of the high-
way; that he then applied his brakes (R. 269); that in 
his judgment he was going 25 miles per hour when he 
saw Earley in front of him; that he traveled probably 
fifty feet from the time he first noticed the low light 
(R. 270) until he recognized the truck racross his lane; 
that he got the impression the car was pointed north 
and east; that he then ap·plied his brakes a little more; 
that the parked vehicle appeared to be up to the center 
line of the highway (R. 271); that Earley w:as from 30 
to 50 feet from ·the ·parked truck when he got hit; that 
when he first saw Earley, Earley appeared to be in the 
center of the road (R. 272); that Earley was 15 or 20 
feet in front of him (R. 277); that he hit Earley with such 
force ra.s to damage the grille and the front portion of 
the hood and he knocked or carried him into the creek 
(R. 278). 
Muder further testified (.and this was the only 
positive evidence one way or another) that the truck 
driven by Early had no side lights nor reflectors on the 
sides (R. 283). 
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At the close of the evidence defendant moved for 
a directed verdict (R. 285) and rene,ved that motion by 
motion for judgment not"ithstanding the verdict (R. 8). 
Both motions were denied and this appeal followed. 
POINTS. 
The facts m this case show the iplaintiff to be 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, 
and he cannot recover. 
ARGUMENT. 
The plaintiff parked his automobile 1n the night-
time crosswise of the highway. At the point where 
he parked his car a stream crossed the highw,ay from 
south to north, and there was a six £oot embank-
ment down to the bed of the stream. He parked 
his car, not by stopping parallel on the highway, hut 
by backing around so that his vehicle w~as almost 
squarely :across the eastbound or south p·ortion of 
the highway and pointed slightly east of n·orth. The 
rear of the vehicle was at the edge of the south 
shoulder and the ·front edge of the vehicle was but 
inches from the center of the highway. The hard 
surfaced portion of this highway was 21 feet wide, 
and for some distance on either side of where this 
plaintiff parked his truck guard posts were erected 
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alongside the edge of the hard surfaced road, so that 
the shoulders were beyond the guard posts, narrow-
ing the highway for vehicular traffic to 21 feet as 
the shoulders could not be used. 
The headlights were pointed slightly east of north 
and the rear end of the vehicle was hanging out over 
the edge of the highway toward the south. The head-
lights were across the highway with nothing to inter-
sect them or refleet them onto the highway and the 
tail light was shining off to the south. The side of 
this vehicle was facing the direction from which 
defendant's automobile 'approached, and no flares, side-
lights nor reflectors were on the vehicle nor placed in 
the vicinity. The ~parking of this vehicle in this fash-
ion was entirely for the convenience of the plaintiff. 
His only purpose in so parking was s,o he could more 
·conveniently unload his vehicle into the bed of the 
stream. 
In thus parking his vehicle the plaintiff offended 
against Section 57-7-165, Utah Code, reading: 
''Upon any highway outside of a business 
or residence district no person shall stop, park 
or leave standing any vehicle, whether ~attended 
or unattended, upon the paved or main traveled 
part of the highway when it is practical to stop, 
park or so leave such vehicle off such. ,p~art of 
said highway, but in every event an unobstructed 
width of the highway ,opposite a standing vehicle 
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shall be left for the free passage ·of other 
vehicles and a clear view of such stopped vehicle 
shall be available from a distance of 200 feet 
in each direction upon such highway.'' 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Huston v. 
Robinson (1944), 13 N. W. (2) 885 had this to say 
about a statute similar to the ·above quoted section: 
''On the ·other hand, there is danger ·of be-
. ing struck from the rear when one stops his 
car because of- poor visibility on a highly trav-
.:led highw-ay. The law imposes certain require-
ments upon a driver in thus blocking the high-
. way. The purpose of the statute ;hereinbefore 
:J_uoted is to keep the highway free from obstruc-
tions by standing vehicles. The requirement in 
that respect is positive unless cireumstances 
exist which make moving of the vehicle off the 
paved, improved or main traveled portion of 
the highway imp~racticable. '' 
The California Supreme Court 1n Thomson v. 
Bayless (1944), 150 Pacific (2) 413 in construing and 
applying a section of the California motor vehicle 
code exactly similar to Section 57-7-165, states: 
''A violation of this section, designed to 
protect persons traveling on the highway, con-
stitutes negligence by the operator of the 
vehicle. * * * The evidence shows the truck 
and trailer were parked 'outside of a business 
or residence district * * * upon the paved or 
improved or main traveled p·ortion of the high-
way' within the meaning of section 582, and 
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defendants do not dispute this fact. It fol-
lows, therefore, insofar as defendants' negli-
gence is concerned, the only question to be 
determined is whether or not it was 'practi-
cable' for Bayless to park off the highway. 
''Although it may be inconsistent with gen-
eral rules of statutory ·construction, * * * the 
courts in this state have uniformly held for 
the past 12 years that :a prima facie case of 
negligence is establ~shed under section 582 by 
proof that the vehicle was left on the paved 
portion of the highway outside of a business or 
residential district and that the burden to show 
that it was not practicable to drive off the main 
traveled portion of the highway rests upon the 
O~)ier:ator of such vehicle.'' 
Paragraph (13) of Section 57-7-167 prohibits the 
stopping, standing or parking of a vehicle upon any 
bridge or other elevated structure. This plaintiff 
parked his car on the portion of the highway where 
it was narrowest, where there was a steep embank-
ment six feet or more in height from the level of 
the highway to the stream, and he had parked it imme-
diately on top of the ·culvert or opening under the 
highway through which the stream flowed. Add to 
this the guard p·osts erected and in place along the 
highway at that point and one h~as the highway pass-
ing over a stream on the equivalent of a bridge. 
In addition to the plaintiff's negligence in the 
way he parked his car as shown above, the record 
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shows that he took no steps 'vhatever to warn any 
on-coming traffic of the presence of his truck on the 
traveled portion of the highway. 
Section 57-7-191, Utah Code, requires, when there 
is insufficient light to reYeal any person or ohject 
within a distance of 500 feet upon such highway, a 
vehicle parked or stopped shall be equipped with one 
or more lamps ''"~hich shall exhibit a white light on 
the roadway side visible from a distance of 500 feet 
to the front of such vehicle and a red light visible from 
a distance of 500 feet to the rear.'' 
At the time of this accident there was insufficient 
light to reveal a person or object 500 feet down the 
highway. The proof was it was nighttime and totally 
dark, and ~he defendant, taking the worst . of the 
evidence against him, did not observe the truck until 
he was about 250 feet away from it. The headlights 
on plaintiff's vehicle as it was parked constituted no 
warning of any kind and were not ''on the roadway 
side", as the headlights were pointed away from the 
approaching automobile. The place where the truck 
was parked was six feet or more above the level of 
the surrounding land, and there were no trees or 
other obstructions off the side of the road which 
would reflect the headlights of the parked vehicle 
(exhibit 2). No red lights were showing to the rear 
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at -all. The evidence is uncontroverted there were no 
reflectors on the side of plaintiff's truck. Clearly the 
plaintiff violated the provisions of the above statute. 
The court's attention is further called to the pro-
visions of 57-7-212 and 57-7-213, which show a clear 
legislative intent that people operating trucks should 
give -a maximum warning to other users of the high-
way in the event they are compelled to stop on the 
high:way or the shoulder of the highway in the night-
time. These statutes require the carrying and, in the 
event of being disabled, exhibiting of flares, lanterns 
or reflectors at stated distances in front of :and behind 
a truck stopped upon the highw-ay or shoulder thereof. 
It is submitted that when such duties :are put 
upon innocent operators of trucks whose trucks .break 
down at thn~s and places beyond their control that 
similar warning devices or some [)irecautions or warn-
ings must be made by plaintiff under the circumstances 
of his parking :as shown in this case. Here the plain-
tiff had full control of the situation. He could select 
the spot at which he wished to stop, he knew how 
long he would obstruct the highway and he appreciated 
at the time that he was creating a dangerous situa-
tion :and a hazard to himself and others on the high-
way. Notwithstanding all this the defendant did noth-
ing to warn other traffic. 
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All these statutes 'Yhich deal with the manner 
and time a person may park a truck upon the high-
way point to the fact that the law regards parking 
and stopping of trucks on rural highways, especially 
at nighttime, as creating a hazardous situation. High-
ways are meant for travel purposes, not for the park-
ing of vehicles or for the unloading of them, particu-
larly at nighttime. It was a highly dangerous and 
negligent situation which ;p·laintiff set up that night. 
It was fr.aught with danger to himself and all others 
using that highway. 
Situations where trucks or automobiles have been 
parked upon the traveled portion of the highway, or 
even on the shoulders, and where it is night time, 
have come before the courts on many occasions and 
they have uniformly held that the failure to have the 
vehicle properly lighted or to put ·out flares is negli-
gence per se. In the case of Newton vs. Pacific High-
way Transport Co., 139 Pac. (2) 725 (Wash. 1943), 
where there was a fact dispute as to whether or not the 
truck occupied the traveled portion of the highway, 
the court said that if the jury reconciled this conflict 
against the truck driver, that such parking would be 
negligence per se. We quote : 
"As to the de;pth it so extended, the evi-
dence is in conflict. It encroached at least to 
the middle of the south lane, and there is evi-
dence from which the jury could find that it 
extended to within two feet of the center line 
of the pavement. Intending to remain there 
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but a few moments, the driver did not put out 
flares. Conceding that it was not possible to 
p·ark in any other manner, the omission to put 
out flares, since it was dark, w:as of itself a 
violation of the statutes, and, therefore, negli-
gence per se. ' ' 
A similar decision was reached m Duncam, vs. 
Madrid, 101 Pac. (2} 382 (N.Mex. 1940) and in Barone, 
et al vs. Jones, et al, 177 Pac. (2) 30 (Cal. 1947). 
Failure to have lights showing on the car parked, 
stopped but n~t dis:abled, is held to be a violation of 
a statute similar to Utah's and therefore negligence. 
Hall, et ux vs. Associated Oil Co., et: al, 65 Pac. (2) 
954. Paulsen, et .al vs. Spencer, 177 Pac. (2) 597, and 
in Hine vs. Leppard, 42 Pac. (2) 389, the court stated 
as follows: 
"The California Vehicle Act (Deering's Gen. 
Laws (1931 Ed.) Act 5128, sec 106) required 
th_g truck to 'carry at the rear a lighted lamp 
exhibiting a red light plainly visible under 
normal :atmospheric conditions for a distance 
of five hundred feet toward the rear. * * * ' 
Had the truck displayed- such a light, the plain-
tiff might have seen it in time to have avoided 
the ,collision. It was not necessary for him 
to have stopped. Had he seen the truck in 
time, he could have gone around it." 
In Ashley vs. Safeway, Inc., 47 P.ac. (2) 53, the 
court stated: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
''The evidence discloses th:at the truck was 
partly upon the gravel shoulder and partly upon 
the paved or oiled portion of the road, so that 
a car approaching from its rear and upon 
that side of the road would have to turn out 
toward the center of the road in order to pass 
safely around it. There were no lights burning 
on the truck either front or back. * * * * '' 
''There is no merit in the contention that 
any negligence on the part of Ballard had 
expended itself prior to the accident. His negli-
gence in allowing the unlighted truck to stand 
upon the highway in the dark continued as 
long as he left it standing there in that man-
. ner. It is true, as defendant points out, that, 
while motion is the law of the road, Kitt was 
not entitled to assume that the highway would 
·be at all times unobstructed in the line of his 
travel. Morton v. Mooney, 97 Mont. 1, 33 P. 
(2d) 262. Kitt vvas entitled to assume that a 
truck standing upon the highway at night would 
display lights both upon the front and rear 
thereof. Section 1753, Rev. Codes Mont. 1921, 
· provides in part as follows: 'During the period 
between one hour after sunset and one hour 
before sunrise, every motor vehicle * * ·* shall 
display two white lights in front * * * and one 
light in the rear.' A violation of this statute 
constitutes negligence. Simpson v. Miller, 97 
M·ont. 328, 34 P. (2d) 528. '' 
In G.reisen vs. Robins, et ux, 216 Pac. ( 2) 210 
(Wash. 1950), where a statute similar to the Utah 
statute was construed, the court stated the case as 
follows: 
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"The res~}ondent parked his car, on the 
night of September 18, 1948, outside the city 
limits of Seattle, so that it extended two feet 
onto the traveled, hard-surfaced portion of the 
highway. At this point, the pavement was 
twenty-one feet wide with four and one-half 
foot shoulders on each side. The automobile was 
unlighted. This was negligence per se, being in 
violation of Rem. Rev. Stat., Vol. 7 A, Sec. 6360-
110, P.P.C. Sec. 295-71, and Rem. Rev. Stat., 
Vol. 7 A, Sec. 63'60-19, P.P.C. Sec. 291-11." 
* * * ''Accordingly, we hold that the re-
spondent was guilty of contributory negligence, 
as a matter of law, and that the trial court 
erred in not granting the motions to dismiss 
and for judgment n.o.v.'' 
Plaintiff appreciated the gra:vity of the situation 
he created. He admitted he had effectively blocked 
one lane of the highway (the lane in which the 
a:pproaching vehicle was operating). He admits he 
knew he was taking a chance when he p1arked his 
vehicle in that fashion and that he was creating a 
dangerous situation on the highway. He als'o admitted 
he knew that the approaching car, in order to get 
around him, would have to go over on the north half 
of the highway, and he stated he appreciated that 
fact at the time. He also stated that knowing all that 
he went west on the north h~alf of the highway, right 
into the face of the oncoming automobile, which auto-
mobile gave no indication to him that it was going 
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to slow dow·n or 'vas slowing down. Nothing the 
plaintiff could have done would have made it more 
dangerous for him. 
The defendant's automobile took a perfectly nor-
mal course under the circumstances. The pl!aintiff 
had blocked one-half the highway. It is perfectly 
natural that the driver of the approaching vehicle 
should turn to the left to avoid the truck and continue 
along the highway. In view of the evidence in this 
case, it is the only thing any person would expect to 
happen. The statute requires that sufficient of the 
highway remain open for the passage of vehicles, and 
the defendant's vehicle had the right· to turn to the 
left and proceed over the unblocked portion of the 
highway, Paulsen vs. Spencer, S1J)pvra. There was at 
that time no approaching traffic from the east which 
would make such a turn dangerous or improper. And 
the plaintiff expected that to happen as he knew the 
situation better than anyone-he had created it. In view 
of the speed at which plaintiff claimed defendant's 
truck was traveling, and the further fact that plain-
tiff states defendant showed no indication of ever 
slowing down, there was nothing plaintiff could expect 
defendant to do except turn to the left and proceed 
past the parked car on the unblocked portion of the 
highway. All this the i>laintiff knew, and yet he 
ran down the highway on the only side left open for 
passage in an attempt to warn of the danger he had 
created. 
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The plain tiff in this action was not only negli-
gent in parking his vehicle in the manner and at the 
place in which he did, but he was negligent in pursu-
ing the course he followed in his effort to extricate him-
self and to give warning of the dangerous condition which 
he erected and brought into being upon the highway. 
We refer this court to the case of· Keller v. Brene-
marn (Wash. 1929), 279 Pacific 588. In that case it 
appeared plaintiff's truck became stalled on the high-
way when it ran out of gasoline. He left it with one 
corner protruding 2 or 3 feet over the .center of the 
highway. He then started out looking for someone 
to get some gasoline, and was walking near the center 
of the highway when he was struck by an ~automo­
bile. At the time he was struck he was walking toward 
the automobile which struck him. This automobile had 
come over the top of a grade in the road, on the 
right side of the highway, and it swerved to the left 
.and struck the plaintiff and his parked truck. 
The Supreme Court of Washington held that 
the plaintiff was negligent, first in running out of 
gasoline, as he knew how far he was going to go and 
should have p·repared himself, second in leaving his 
truck in the position he did on the highway contrary 
to a statute ·of the state of Washington, .and that 
* * * ''when the appellant left the truck to go 
upon his errand, he became a pedestrian, sub-
ject to the statutes applicable to p·edestrians 
traveling on the public . highways.'' 
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The court :points out that a statute of Washington 
required pedestrians to travel along the left side of 
a highway and that the appellant gave no heed to 
this statute. It also sets out that viol~ation of a stat-
ute in "\Vashington is negligence in law. It sustained 
a holding by the trial court that plaintiff was barred 
from recovering by reason of his contributory negli-
gence. 
Section 57-7-78.5 (d) defines a pedestrian as "any 
person afoot". 
Comparatively recently, this court has decided 
three cases involving people ·on foot on the highway. 
They are 
Re.id v. Owens (1939), 93 Pacific (2) 680, 98 
Utah 50; 
Mingus v. Olsson (1949), 201 Pac. (2) 495, 
Sant v. Miller (1949), 206 Pac. (2) 719. 
In Reid v. Owens, the injured person left a trench 
In the street in which he was working and crossed 
the highway on an errand and was struck and killed. 
This court said he had a duty to observe and stated 
''He either :proceeded without looking or, hav-
ing seen the approaching car, he chanced cross-
ing in face of the hazard. The approaching 
vehicle was at the instant of deceased's entry 
onto the pavement so near that no prudent 
p·erson would attempt crossing in front of it. 
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The more reasonable inference is that he did 
not see the car. But had he looked he would 
have seen it, and he is charged with knowledge 
of what he would have seen had he the duty to 
look. We think that he clearly had such duty." 
Mingus v. Olson. The deceased was struck on a 
cross-walk in Salt Lake City. There was evidence he 
did not look, and the court remarks that on the evi-
dence it ''must be said as a matter of law that 
deceased either failed to look, or having looked, failed· 
to see what he should have seen.'' 
Sanf} v. Miller involved a pedestrian crossing a 
street in Logan not at a crosswalk. He was struck 
when not looking and the court held it his duty to 
look. This language of the court we think pertinent: 
'' Ap·pellant was aware of the :fact that he 
was taking a chance in crossing the street at 
a place ·contrary to law. He should also have 
known that a driver of a vehicle would not ordi-
narily anticipate the presence of pedestrians on 
the street at the time and place of the accident. 
* * * Having omitted to continue to watch, he 
failed to exercise the degree of care required 
of a pedestrian who leaves a place of safety 
and places himself in a position of peril. A 
greater degree of care is necessary upon the 
·part of a pedestrian who undertakes to cross 
a city street at a prohibited place than is placed 
on one who uses a marked crosswalk. And 
especially is this true when because of darkness 
and climatic conditions, the opportunity for 
drivers to clearly discern the presence of ind.ivid-
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uals on the road,Yay is greatly restricted. It 
is not due care for a pers~on to fail to observe 
what might be approaching danger when there 
is no necessity to look elsewhere. Appellant 
"""as not confronted with a situation which dis-
tracted his attention or which precluded him 
from continuously observing the oncoming 
traffic. * • • ' ' 
The holdings of this court in these three cases 
were that the injured and deceased persons were 
guilty of contributory negligence precluding recoveries, 
because of failure to look or observe what was there 
to be -seen. 
On the facts none of the above cases are as strong 
as the one at bar. This plaintiff by his own testimony 
stated: 
(a) He saw the oncoming automobile; 
(b) He knew and appreciated only one lane of 
travel was open for it to proceed; 
(c) He was aware defendant's vehicle was con-
tinuing and would continue- it was not diminishing 
its speed as· far as he was concerned; 
(d) He took a position on the only part of the 
highway the approaching automobile could travel upun; 
(e) He had op;portunity to avoid the accident 
at any time up until he was struck by stepping off 
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the travelled portion of the highway. (Defendant's 
automobile never left the paved portion of this high-
way until opposite the parked truck, as shown by 
the tr~a,cks.) 
Section 57-7-146, Utah Code, reads: 
'' (b) Where sidewalks are not provided any 
pedestrian walking along and upon a highway 
shall. when practicable walk only on the left side of 
the roadway or its shoulder facing traffic which 
may ap~)lroach from the opposite direction.'' 
In view of the above section of the Utah Code, 
defendant had an absolute right to proceed on the 
assumption that any person walking down the highway 
in the vicinity of this parked truck, or otherwise, 
would proceed toward the defendant on the south 
edge of the road. It was the plaintiff's failure to abide 
by the provisions of this statute and his failure to 
proceed towards · the defendant on the south edge of 
the road, and also the ~ilaintiff's failure to proceed 
·on the shoulder of the road, facing traffic which might 
approach him from the opposite direction, which placed 
the pl~a.intiff in such position that he was struck by 
defendant's vehicle. Had plaintiff obeyed that statute 
no accident would have happened. But no, he took a 
course which could lead to nothing but extreme danger 
for himself in an attempt to give warning of a peril 
and emergency which he had created. This plaintiff 
might just as well have run down a railroad track into 
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the path of an approaching train he knew would not 
stop. He '•hoped'' the ap~proaching automobile would 
stop, but nothing he saw or hea.rd gave him any indi-
cation it was going to stop. 
The plaintiff's conduct in this case is so novel 
and unique in its various aspects that the writers of 
this brief have been unable to find any case specifically 
in point covering his conduct in running down the 
highway towards the defendant's automobile. It is 
submitted, however, that the following rule as a matter 
of general principle derived from the many many cases 
cited in support of it, controls in such a situation. We 
quote from Section 121 of 65 C. J. S. on Negligence, 
page 727, et seq. : 
''One who kn·ows and appreciates, or in the 
exercise of ordinary care should have known 
and appreciated, the existence of danger from 
which injury might reasonably he anticipated 
must exercise -ordinary care to avoid such injury. 
One must also exercise ordinary care to avoid 
the consequences of another's negligence. Thus, 
where the defect or danger is patent or obvious, 
it is contributory negligence to fail to exercise 
ordinary care to avoid it. Conduct involving an 
undue risk of harm to the actor is contributory 
negligence, and one who by his voluntary acts 
or omissions exposes himself to danger ~of which 
he has actual or imputed knowledge is guilty 
of negligence, if, under the same or similar 
circumstances, an ordinarily prudent person 
would not have incurred the risk of injury 
which such conduct involved. The rule is equally 
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applicable to one who, having taken a position 
of danger without knowledge and appreciation 
thereof, thereafter becomes fully cognizant of 
the danger and continues to expose himself to it.'' 
The plaintiff cannot claim that his conduct under 
the circumstances of this case is to be tested against 
a background of sudden emergency or sudden peril 
because one who creates the emergency or sudden 
peril himself cannot take advantage of it as one of 
the surrounding circumstances to avoid a charge of 
contributory negligence. We quote from Section 41, 
Acts in Emergency or Sudden Peril in 38 Am. Jur. 
on Negligence, page 687 : 
''Moreover, one placed in sudden danger by 
reason of an emergency is held resiponsible for 
error of judgment, if his own negligent, reck-
less, or wanton conduct contributed to cause 
the emergency. ·One who is at fault in bringing 
about an emergency is necessarily at fault ~s to 
the injurious consequences thereof. The rule 
that when one faced with sudden peril is com-
pelled to act instinctively, he is not held to 
the exercise of the same degree of care as if 
:he had time for reflection, cannot he invoked by 
one who has brought the emergency upon him-
self by his own wrong or who has not used due 
care to avoid it. * * * * Before one can absolve 
himself from liability for injury caused by act-
ing upon emergency to save himself from harm, 
he must show not only that an emergency existed 
which was brought about by no negligent act 
of his own but also that the resultant injury 
could not have been prevented after the peril 
to him . had ceased. '' 
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Utah recognizes that one is not relieved by reason 
of emergency or 1peril which he creates himself. We 
quote from Harris vs. Parks, 58 Utah 42, 196 Pac 1002 
at page 45 of the Utah Reports: 
"\'Vhere one is confronted with threatened 
danger and is suddenly in an emergency not 
created by himself, called upon to determine on 
his course of action, he is not held to the same 
care and degree of caution that he might be 
under different circumstances." (Italics ours) 
This proposition was ·brought specifically before 
the District Court of Appeal of the State of California 
in Yates vs. Marotti, et oil, 8 Pac. (2) 519, where the 
court said: 
''The doctrine which may excuse one for a 
lack of sound judgment with respect to his con-
duct when he is suddenly confronted with immi-
nent peril has no application to one who has 
brought the emergency upon himself by his 
own willful, reckless, or negligent conduct. The 
rule applies to one who, without fault on his 
own part, finds himself suddenly confronted with 
imminent peril. ·Rush v. Lagomarsino, 196, Cal. 
308, 237 P. 1066 ; Neff v. United Railroads, 188 
Cal. 722, 207 P. 243; Brooks v. City of Monterey, 
106 Cal. Ap~~. 649, 657, .290 P. 540; Gootar v. 
Levin, 109 ·Cal. App. 703, 293 Pac. 706; 3-4 
Huddy's Enc. of Auto. Law (9th Ed.) 348, Sec. 
182; 19 Cal. Jur. 602, Sec. 38; 42 C. J. 891, 
Sec. 592. The doctrine of 'imminent peril' IS 
therefore no excuse for the accident.'' 
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Under the circumstances, men of reasonable minds 
could not differ as to the conduct of the plaintiff. 
With full knowledge of the danger to himself he pro-
ceeded directly into the face of an approaching auto-
mobile, which was under his observation at all times. 
He could have avoided the injury by simply stepping 
aside to the north edge of the highway, as the physical 
evidence ·Of the tire track shows that the defendant at 
no time prior to his passing the parked truck left the 
oiled 1portion of the highway. As we have previously 
stated, the plaintiff knew that the only open lane of 
traffic was the one he was proceeding in ~and he knew, 
or unquestionably should have known, that the de-
fendant would move into that lane to pass the plain-
tiff's parked truck. The plaintiff further admits that 
there were no indications at any time that the defend-
ant saw him or was taking any steps to avoid him or 
to take any steps to stop. Plaintiff knew, or should 
have known, that with the highway obstructed by his 
truck the defendant's attention would he focused mainly 
. 
on safely passing through the opening left between 
the front of the truck and the poles erected at the left 
edge of the oiled 'surface of the highway and that· it 
was reasonably forseeable that defendant would not 
observe plaintiff until it was late to avoid him. Yet in 
spite of the situation, plaintiff proceeded directly into 
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the face of the oncoming automobile. There is no ques-
tion of fact to be submitted to a jury as to plaintiff's 
conduct being negligent and proximately contributing 
to his injuries. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that for all practical purposes the 
plaintiff blocked one-half of the highway with his truck 
and then blocked the other half of the highway with 
himself. The situation developed under his observa-
tion at all times. He knew of the approach of the 
automobile for over half a mile. He knew the entire 
situation he had erected, then he took the position on 
the highway occupying the only path which he had 
left open for travel. J~dging the conduct of the plain-
tiff up to the time he parked his vehicle and started to 
unload it, and also from the time he left his vehicle 
and went down the highway, or judging the conduct of 
the plaintiff on the basis of the situation as a whole, 
it is inescapable that plaintiff's own acts contributed 
to and produced the accident and injuries to himself. 
These acts were careless and negligent in the extreme 
and done in the face of known, approaching danger. 
We submit that defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict should have been granted because of the con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant's 
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motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
made after verdict, in which motion defendant renewed 
his motion for a directed verdict, should also have been 
granted. This case should be reversed with instruc-
tions to dismiss. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDGAR C. JENSEN 
ROBERT A. BURNS 
ROBERT JOHN JENSEN 
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